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Abstract 
Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a sharp decline in global inflation, growth and 
interest rate. From 1981 to 2014, global financial uncertainty forecasts 18.26% and 14.95% of 
the variation in global growth and global inflation, respectively. Global uncertainty shocks 
exhibit more protracted, statistically significant and substantial effects on the global growth, 
inflation and interest rate than U.S. uncertainty shocks. U.S. uncertainty lags global uncertainty 
by one month. When controlling for domestic uncertainty, the decline in output following a 
rise in global uncertainty is statistically significant in each country, with the exception of the 
decline for China. The effects for the U.S. and China are also relatively small. For most 
economies, a positive shock to global uncertainty has a depressing effect on prices and official 
interest rates – exceptions are Brazil, Mexico and Russia, which represent economies with large 
capital outflows during financial crises. Decomposition of global uncertainty shocks shows that 
global financial uncertainty shocks are more important than non-financial shocks.  
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Impact of Global Uncertainty on the Global Economy and Large 
Developed and Developing Economies 
1. Introduction 
The adverse impact of uncertainty on economic activity has received renewed interest 
following the influential study of Bloom (2009). These investigations have analyzed the effect 
of country level uncertainty (usually U.S. uncertainty) on economic variables within a country, 
or alternatively, they have considered the impact of a measure of global uncertainty on 
economic variables within a country. 1  The rapid and accelerating process of financial 
globalization and new technologies prompts the question as to whether it is useful for economic 
uncertainty to be addressed as a global phenomenon, whose effects are examined for the global 
economy with either a country-specific occurrence or a global occurrence examined for 
country-specific effects.  
In this study, we aim to answer the following questions: How does global uncertainty 
affect the global economy? Do global uncertainty shocks have different effects than U.S. 
uncertainty shocks on the global economy? How do large developed and developing economies 
respond to global uncertainty shocks? Does the source of uncertainty shock matter for the 
global economy? To answer these questions, we developed an index of global uncertainty using 
the first principal component of the stock market volatility of the largest 15 economies.2 We 
also evaluated the impact of global uncertainty on global interest rate, inflation and industrial 
production using the new global database from Global Economic Indicators (DGEI), Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.3   
                                                          
1 See, for example, Bloom (2009), Gilchrist et al. (2010), Knotek and Khan (2011), Fernández-Villaverde et al. 
(2011), Bekaert et al. (2013), Bachmann et al. (2013), Leduc and Liu (2015), Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2014) 
and Jurado et al. (2015). 
2  Note that Bloom et al. (2007) show that share-return volatility is significantly correlated with alternative 
measures of uncertainty proxies. 
3 The methodology underlying the Global Economic Indicators (DGEI) database is provided in Grossman et al. 
(2014). 
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The empirical literature on economic uncertainty has generally focused on the volatility 
of stock market returns and/or firm profitability as providing a measure of uncertain 
environments within which decisions are made.4 High uncertainty causes firms to postpone 
investment and hiring and consumers to delay important purchases with unfavorable 
consequences for economic growth. In a major paper, Bloom (2009) emphasizes the negative 
impact of uncertainty on employment and output for the U.S. after World War II. In his work, 
Bloom develops an uncertainty index based on firm stock return and/or firm profit growth.   
An alternative measure of uncertainty based on spreads between low and high rated 
corporate bonds are discussed by a number of authors, including contributions by Favero 
(2009), Arellano et al. (2010) and Gilchrist et al. (2010). Bredin and Fountas (2009) utilize a 
general bivariate GARCH-M model to generate the macroeconomic uncertainty associated 
with output growth and inflation in EU countries. More recently, Jurado et al. (2015) argue that 
stock market volatility may not be closely linked to “true” economic uncertainty, and they 
propose new time series measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. These time series indicators 
are built with U.S. macroeconomic data and are identified as the unforecastable component of 
the macroeconomic series. Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) develop a more general approach to 
describe macroeconomic uncertainty. Their macroeconomic index is based on assessing the 
likelihood of the realized forecast error of macroeconomic variables. Forecasts that are more 
difficult to realize correspond to greater uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment. 
Charemza et al. (2015) suggest a new measure of inflation forecast uncertainty that accounts 
for possible inter-country dependence.  
Berger and Herz (2014) measure global uncertainty as the conditional variances of 
global factors in inflation and output growth in a bivariate dynamic factor model with GARCH 
                                                          
4 An important thread in the literature is that uncertainty faced by the individual firm is embodied in its own stock 
price volatility, as discussed in Leahy and Whited (1996), Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2007) and Baum et al. 
(2010), among others. 
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errors for nine industrialized countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Delrio (2016) assumes that the spread between 
each country’s interbank rate and the federal funds rate is a measure of relative riskiness. This 
variable is then interacted with global uncertainty given by the realized volatility of daily MSCI 
World Index returns over calendar quarters. Hirata et al. (2012) find that global house prices 
are synchronized and that global uncertainty shocks seem to be important in explaining 
fluctuations in global house prices. As in Bloom (2009), uncertainty is given by the volatility 
of daily equity prices of the G-7. Ozturk and Sheng (2016) construct a monthly measure of 
global uncertainty as the PPP-weighted average of the country-specific uncertainties for a 
dataset of forecast data for 46 advanced and emerging market economies.  
Leduc and Liu (2015) examine the effects of uncertainty – which are measured by 
Michigan Survey results on the fraction of respondents reporting that an “uncertain future” 
makes it a bad time to buy cars or durable goods over the next 12 months – on the U.S. 
unemployment rate. Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2014) estimate the impact of U.S. GDP growth 
volatility shocks on the UK in a structural VAR model with time-varying volatility.  
In this study, we build on the methodology of Bloom (2009) to construct a global 
uncertainty index using the first principal component of stock market volatility of 15 major 
developed and developing economies. It provides a forward-looking indicator that is implicitly 
weighted in accordance with the impact of different sources of uncertainty across major 
countries in the world on equity value. Our measure of global uncertainty captures important 
political, war, financial and economic events over the period 1981 to 2014 and shows high 
correlations with alternative measures based on the methodology of Jurado et al. (2015) and 
Ozturk and Sheng (2016).  
The results show that global uncertainty shocks are less frequent than those observed 
in data on the U.S. economy. The global uncertainty shocks are associated with a sharp decline 
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in global interest rate, inflation and industrial production. The maximum decline of global 
inflation and industrial production occurs six months after a global uncertainty shock, while 
the maximum decline in global interest rate occurs 16 months after a global uncertainty shock.  
Our decomposition of global uncertainty shocks shows that global financial uncertainty 
shocks are more important than non-financial shocks. From 1981 to 2014, global financial 
uncertainty forecasts 18.26% and 14.95% of the variation in global growth and inflation, 
respectively. In contrast, the non-financial uncertainty forecasts only 7.75% and 2.15% of the 
variation in global growth and inflation, respectively.  The effects of U.S. uncertainty on global 
output, inflation and official interest rate are smaller and less statistically significant than the 
effects of global uncertainty. Measures of U.S. uncertainty and global uncertainty are not 
substitutable, and global uncertainty leads U.S. uncertainty by one month. Output declines in 
each country with a rise in global uncertainty even controlling for domestic uncertainty, with 
relatively small effects for the outputs of China and U.S. inflation and the official interest 
decline with positive shocks to global uncertainty; exceptions include Brazil, Mexico and 
Russia.  
This paper proceeds as follows. An index of global uncertainty is constructed in Section 
2. The effect of global uncertainty on the global economy is modeled in Section 3. In Section 
4, preliminary results are examined with a FAVAR model. Section 5 compares the differences 
between the U.S. and global uncertainty shocks. Section 6 examines the effects of global 
uncertainty decomposed into financial and non-financial origins. The effect of global 
uncertainty on individual major economies when controlling for local uncertainty is evaluated 
in section 7. Section 8 provides robustness analysis, and Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. An index of global uncertainty 
2.1. Methodology 
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Empirical literature on economic uncertainty has utilized the variability of stock market 
returns and firm profitability to provide a measure of uncertainty that can influence economic 
and financial variables. In this study, we build upon this methodology by constructing a global 
uncertainty index given by the first principal component of stock market volatility of the largest 
15 economies. 5  It provides a forward-looking indicator that is implicitly weighted in 
accordance with the impact of different sources of uncertainty across major countries in the 
world on equity value. 
Let 𝑅𝑐,𝑡 be the difference of the natural log of the stock market index of country 𝑐: 
𝑅𝑐,𝑡 = ln 
𝑆𝑐𝑡
𝑆𝑐𝑡−1
,   (1) 
where 𝑠𝑐𝑡 denotes the average monthly stock price for a given country 𝑐 at time 𝑡, with 𝑡 =
1,2… , 𝑇. Let 
𝑉𝑐𝑡 = (𝑅𝑐,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑐,𝑡)
2,     (2) 
where 𝑉𝑐𝑡 is the stock market volatility of country 𝑐 at time 𝑡, ?̅?𝑐,𝑡 is the sample average of 
𝑅𝑐,𝑡. The stock market volatility index is then estimated for the largest 15 economies in 2013 
according to the gross domestic product (based on purchase power parity). The countries 
include Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, France, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
South Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom (U.K) and the United Sates (U.S).6 
Given a data matrix with 𝑉𝑐𝑡  for the 15 largest economies and 𝑛 samples, we first 
center on the means of  𝑉𝑐𝑡. The first principal component for the global uncertainty index  
(𝐺𝑈𝑡)  is given by the linear combination of all 15 volatility 
indices  𝑉𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎,𝑡, 𝑉𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑙,𝑡,…., 𝑉𝑈𝑆,𝑡,. Formally,  
𝐺𝑈𝑡 = 𝑎1𝑉𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑉𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑙,𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝑎15𝑉𝑈𝑆,𝑡.    (3) 
                                                          
5 This first principal component accounts for around 40% of the data variation.  
6 We attempt to estimate this index for G20 economies. However, data for Indonesia, Iran, Thailand Nigeria and 
Poland were not available for the full sample period. An alternative measure of global uncertainty including these 
countries for a shorter span is discussed in section 8.6. 
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𝐺𝑈𝑡 is calculated such that it accounts for the greatest possible variance in the data set. The 
weights  (𝑎𝑖) are the elements of an eigenvector with unit length and standardized by the 
restriction: 𝑎1
2 + 𝑎2
2 + ⋯+ 𝑎15
2 = 1. Data definitions, sources and period availabilities are all 
reported in Table A1.7   
2.2. Global and the U.S. uncertainty indices  
In Figures 1 and 2, we show the global uncertainty index developed in Equation (1) to 
(3) and the U.S. uncertainty index.8 In each Figure, the black line shows the 12-month moving 
average of the index, and the horizontal broken line shows 1.65 standard deviations. We follow 
Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015) in defining uncertainty shocks as those events which 
exceed 1.65 standard deviations. By comparing Figure 1 with Figure 2, several points can be 
made. 
The statistically significant global uncertainty shocks shown in Figure 1 are associated 
with Black Monday (October and November 1987), the Russian Default (September 1998), the 
9/11 terrorist attack (September 2001), WorldCom (July 2002), the Gulf War II (February 
2003) and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) between 2007-2008. The non-economic 
statistically significant global uncertainty shocks, the 9/11 attack and Gulf War II are smaller 
than the economic statistically significant global uncertainty shocks in Figure 1. The 
statistically significant global uncertainty shocks shown in Figure 1 are also statistically 
significant U.S. uncertainty shocks in Figure 2.   
On Monday, October 19, 1987, stock markets around the world collapsed. The fall 
started in Hong Kong and spread west to Europe; in the United States, the Dow Jones Industrial 
                                                          
7 Data from the stock market are not available for all countries from 1981. The index is constructed with data on 
the countries for which data are available. A shortcoming of this approach is that for the earlier period, missing 
data are more apparent for developing countries. Nevertheless, we argue that this is not necessarily a problem, 
given that in the first part of the sample (1980-1995), the relative weight of developed economies in the global 
economy is more important than in the more recent period (following China’s unprecedented growth starting in 
mid-1990s). The availability of stock market data for each country is reported in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
8 The last is just the stock market volatility index constructed with only the data for the U.S. stock market. 
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Average fell by 22.6%. Globally, stock market losses persisted, with markets in Hong Kong, 
the United Kingdom and the United States down by 45.5%, 26.5% and 22.7%, respectively, at 
the end of October 1987. Despite October 19, 1987 being the biggest daily percentage decline 
in the history of the Dow Jones Index, no major (news) event has been associated with the 
stock market crash. Both the monthly U.S. stock market volatility and the monthly global stock 
market volatility were high during October 1987, but they were both even higher during 
November 1987. 
On August 17, 1998, the Russian Central Bank devalued the rubble, and the Russian 
government defaulted on its debt. The background of these developments included high 
inflation (Russian inflation was over 80% during 1998) and the loss of foreign exchange 
reserves associated with decreased revenues from the export of crude oil and other commodities 
attendant on falling prices and weak demand in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in 
late 1997. The Russian devaluation and default caused the Long Term Capital Management 
hedge fund to default on financial contracts worth billions of dollars, leading the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York to orchestrate a rescue effort to avert a major financial collapse. 
During this episode, the monthly U.S. stock market volatility was highest during August 1998, 
as was the global stock market volatility. 
The 9/11 terrorist attack in September 2001 is associated with spikes in volatility in 
both the monthly U.S. stock market volatility and the monthly global stock market volatility. 
In July 2002, large overstated revenues were uncovered in an accounting scandal at WorldCom, 
and the monthly U.S. and global stock market volatility spiked. A series of accounting scandals 
had started at Enron in December 2001 and at a number of large companies including 
WorldCom throughout 2002. 
The Gulf War II started on March 19 and continued to May 1 in 2003. Monthly U.S. 
and global stock market volatilities increased sharply in February 2003 in anticipation of the 
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U.S. invasion of Iraq. Over the next three months, global stock market volatility fell to 
somewhat less than half the value achieved in February 2003 before rising to about 73% of the 
February 2003 level in June 2003. In contrast, the monthly U.S. stock market volatility fell to 
a very low value in March 2003 and achieved values from April to June 2003 of between 73% 
and 89% of the value in February 2003. The implications of this pattern of volatility is that, in 
the moving average plots of data in Figures 1 and 2 from September 2001 to June 2003, the 
monthly U.S. stock market volatility peaks in June 2003 (in the aftermath of the Gulf War II), 
whereas the monthly global stock market volatility peaks in September 2002 (during the 
accounting scandals).  
The GFC includes several events described in detail in Table A3 (Appendix A).  The 
crisis is associated with the subprime mortgage crisis, including the consequent bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the bailout of several financial institutions including 
Northern Rock in UK (February 2008) as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July 2008) and 
American International Group (September 2008) in the U.S.  
Standard & Poor downgraded U.S. sovereign debt from AAA to AA+ on August 5, 
2011. Both U.S. stock market volatility and global stock market volatility spiked in August 
2011. The 12-month moving average for volatility peaked in May 2012 in global stock markets 
and in September 2011 for the U.S. stock market. This difference in timing is apparent when 
comparing Figures 1 and 2. 
The uncertainty associated with the Monetary Cycle turning point (October 1982), the 
Gulf War I (October 1990) and the Asian Crisis (November 1997) are statistically significant 
in the U.S. data depicted in Figure 2 but not in the global data represented in Figure 1. The 
market volatility during the Monetary Cycle turning point is identified with uncertainty over 
the effectiveness of policy during the Reagan administration at dealing with inflation and 
recession. The global uncertainty shock associated with the Monetary Cycle turning point is 
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not statistically significant in Figure 1. Both the monthly volatility and the 12-month moving 
average volatility for the global stock markets peak in September 1982 and fall in the following 
months. The monthly volatility in the U.S. data also peaks in September 1982 and then falls in 
following months. The 12-month moving average volatility for the U.S. stock market has high 
values over the whole period September 1982 to September 1983. A peak in September 1982 
is exceeded slightly in November 1982 and in January 1983. Overall, the Monetary Cycle 
turning point is a much more important uncertainty event in the U.S. data than in the global 
data.  
2.3. Relative importance of high uncertainty events in U.S. and global data 
Table 1 reports the correlation of the lag structure between global uncertainty and the 
measure of U.S. uncertainty. The contemporaneous correlation between global and U.S. 
uncertainties is 0.16. The other correlations in Table 1 are less than 0.16 with two exceptions. 
The exceptions are that the lagged correlations of U.S. uncertainty and global uncertainty are 
0.89 and 0.208 for lags of 1 and 2 months, respectively. The implication for the one-month-lag 
correlation is that if the global uncertainty is high is June, then the U.S. uncertainty is likely to 
be high in July. 
Table 2 reports the Granger causality test between global uncertainty and U.S. 
uncertainty. The null hypothesis is that global uncertainty does not cause U.S. uncertainty, and 
the Granger results show that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 1% level of confidence with 
lags of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. The null hypothesis that U.S. uncertainty does not cause global 
uncertainty cannot be rejected with lags of 1 and 12 months. The correlation and Granger 
causality results support the idea that the measures of U.S. uncertainty and global uncertainty 
are not interchangeable and that, for the most part, U.S. uncertainty is not driving the measure 
of global uncertainty. 
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In Figure 3, the global and U.S. volatility indices are scaled so that the mean volatilities 
are equal. Figure 3 illustrates that the Monetary Cycle turning point, the Gulf War I and the 
Asian Crisis are relatively less important in the global data compared with other high 
uncertainty periods than in the U.S. data. In contrast, in Figure 3, Black Monday, the Russian 
Default, the 9/11 terrorist attack and WorldCom along with their associated accounting 
scandals are relatively more important compared with other high uncertainty periods in the 
global data than they are in the U.S data. The last three major episodes (i.e., Gulf War II, GFC 
and the downgrade of the U.S. sovereign debt) are of approximately equal relative importance 
compared to other high uncertainty periods in the U.S. and global data.  
 
3. Modelling the effect of global uncertainty on the global economy 
3.1. The FAVAR model 
Following Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015) who have utilized VAR models, we 
utilized a FAVAR model to estimate the impact of uncertainty on key macroeconomics 
variables. The endogenous variables in the model include the growth in global output ∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), 
global inflation ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡, global interest rate (based on central bank official/policy interest 
rates) 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡  and global uncertainty variable 𝐺𝑈𝑡 . The global macroeconomic variables are 
factors of variables that are available for the U.S., non-U.S. developed economies as well as 
emerging economies from DGEI, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, for the G40 countries.  
The following structural VAR model of order 𝑝 is utilized:  
𝐴0𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡, (4) 
where   𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝐺𝑈𝑡 ) is a (𝑚 = 4) × 1  vector of endogenous 
variables, 𝐴0  denotes the 4 × 4  contemporaneous coefficient matrix, 𝑐0   represents a 4x1 
vector of constant terms, 𝐴𝑖   refers to the 4 × 4 autoregressive coefficient matrices and 𝜀𝑡  
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stands for a 4 × 1 vector of structural disturbances.9 To construct the structural VAR model 
representation, the reduced-form VAR model is consistently estimated using the least-squares 
method and is obtained by multiplying both sides of Equation (4) by 𝐴0
−1. The reduced-form 
error term is  𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡  and is assumed to be Gaussian distributed. 
The identifying restrictions on 𝐴0
−1  is a lower-triangle coefficient matrix in the 
structural VAR model. This setup follows Christiano et al. (2005), Bekaert et al. (2014) and 
Jurado et al. (2015) in placing the output variable first, followed by global consumer price 
index (CPI), global interest rate and global uncertainty.10 The ordering of the variables assumes 
that the macroeconomic aggregates of output and CPI do not respond contemporaneously to 
shocks to the monetary policy of interest rate. The information of the monetary authority within 
a month 𝑡 consists of current and lagged values of the macroeconomic aggregates and past 
values of the uncertainty. The uncertainty variable ordered last captures the fact that the 
uncertainty is a stock-market-based variable and responds instantly to monetary policy shocks. 
The structural shocks to the dynamic responses of an endogenous variable are then identified 
using a Cholesky decomposition.  
3.2. Data and global macroeconomic variables 
The data for both the global uncertainty index and the VAR models are monthly and 
extend from January 1981 to December 2014. Before 1981, data are not available for most 
variables from many developing countries. Data descriptions, sources and period availabilities 
are presented in Table A2.  
 The global factors 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡 , 𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡  and 𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡  are estimated using data on emerging 
economies, advanced economies (excluding the U.S.) and the U.S. The data on interest rate, 
                                                          
9 We follow Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015) in setting p=12, which allows for a potentially long-delay of 
effects of uncertainty shocks on the economy and for a sufficient number of lags to remove serial correlation. 
10 We omitted the variables stock prices, wages, working hours and employment because these variables are not 
available at the global level. 
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CPI and industrial production are taken from DGEI, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, for the 
G40 countries. In DGEI, weights (based on shares of world GDP [PPP]) are applied to the 
official/policy interest rates (determined by central banks) in levels and are applied to the 
indexes for industrial production and headline price indexes in growth rates to construct indices 
for emerging economies and advanced economies (excluding the U.S). In 2014, on a GDP PPP 
basis, the G40 economies account for 83% of the global GDP. Also, within the G40, the U.S., 
19 advanced economies (excluding the U.S.) and 20 emerging economies account for 18%, 
25%, and 40%, respectively, of the global GDP. Combined, the 20 largest emerging economies 
on a PPP basis are now nearly as large as the 20 largest developed economies. 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 
and 𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡 are the leading principal components: 
𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡 = [𝐼𝑅𝑡
𝐴𝑑, 𝐼𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆, 𝐼𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑚],         (5) 
𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 = [𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐴𝑑, 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝑈𝑆, 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐸𝑚],   (6) 
𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡 = [𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝐴𝑑, 𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝑈𝑆, 𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑚],           (7) 
where the superscripts US, Ad and Em represent the United States, advanced economies 
(excluding the U.S) and emerging economies.11 
 
4. The FAVAR model results  
 The reduced-form VAR model of Equation (4) is consistently estimated by the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method. We utilize the resulting estimates to construct the structural VAR 
representation of the model. The dynamic effect is examined by the impulse responses of global 
output growth, inflation and interest rate to the structural global uncertainty shock. We present 
the responses to one-time global uncertainty shocks as well as to the historical episodes of the 
uncertainty shocks. 
                                                          
11 We deal with missing data in early observations for some series by building the factors with series available at 
this time to maximise the number of time series observations.  
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4.1. The effects of global uncertainty shocks on the economy 
 Figure 4 shows the impact of one standard deviation of the global uncertainty shocks 
on global industrial production growth, global CPI inflation and global interest rate for the 
FAVAR estimation. The dashed lines represent a one-standard-error confidence band around 
the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions. We utilize the impulse 
response functions in Figure 4 to assess the timing and magnitude of the responses to a one-
time global uncertainty shock in the economy. 
On the left hand side of Figure 4, the estimated lags in the VAR system are indicated. 
The FAVAR model is estimated with 3, 6 and 12 lags.  The second, third and fourth columns 
in Figure 4 show responses of global interest rate, CPI inflation and industrial production 
growth to global uncertainty shocks. The results are summarized as follows: 
 Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global 
industrial production growth, which is greatest after 4 to 8 months depending on the 
specification.  
  Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global CPI, 
reaching the greatest point of decline after 6 months. However, when 12 lags are used 
in the VAR system, the greatest point of decline occurs after 10 months.     
 Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a decline in global interest rate; when 3- 
and 6-month lags are used in the VAR systems, the greatest decline in the global interest 
rate is observed after 16 months.12  
 
                                                          
12 When the models are specified with 12 lags, the greatest response occurs after 6 months, with a quick return to 
positive values after 12 months. This pattern is only observed for FAVAR model, and for the FABVAR model, 
Wishart type of priors in models with a 12-month lag. Even with a 12-month lag structure, the FABVAR model 
with Minnesota and Sims-Zha priors gives results that are similar to those obtained in the FAVAR and FABVAR 
models with 3-month and 6-month lags.  
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5. Does the global economy respond differently to global uncertainty shocks compared to 
U.S. uncertainty shocks? 
Given that the U.S. is the world’s largest financial centre, we disaggregate the effects 
of U.S. uncertainty (𝑈𝑆𝑈𝑡) and global uncertainty. U.S. uncertainty is estimated as a volatility 
index of the U.S. stock market. The new vector of endogenous variables is a (𝑚 = 5) × 1 
vector of endogenous variables:  𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡 , 𝑈𝑆𝑈𝑡, 𝐺𝑈𝑡). 𝐴0 denotes the 
5 × 5  contemporaneous coefficient matrix. More precisely, the Cholesky lower triangle 
contemporaneous matrix is estimated by postulating the following 𝐴0𝑦𝑡 matrix form: 
[
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 0 0
𝑎11 1 0 0 0
𝑎21 𝑎22 1 0 0
𝑎31 𝑎32 𝑎33 1 0
𝑎41 𝑎42 𝑎43 0 1]
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡)
∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡)
𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝑆𝑈𝑡
𝐺𝑈𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
, (8) 
where 𝑈𝑆𝑈𝑡  represents the U.S uncertainty shock derived from the volatility of the U.S. stock 
market. Note that coefficient 𝑎44 is set to be zero; this implies that we do not have a preference 
for ordering either the U.S. or global uncertainty first in the Cholesky decomposition.13  
Figure 5 shows the responses of global industrial production, CPI and interest rate to 
global (first row) and U.S. (second row) uncertainty shocks. In the first column, a one-standard-
deviation shock to global uncertainty decreases global industrial production by -0.13. and a 
one-standard-deviation shock to U.S. uncertainty reduces global industrial production by less 
than -0.06. The global uncertainty shock is statistically significant over a more extended period 
of time. The global and U.S. uncertainty shocks are statistically significant over 1 to 16 months 
and 1 to 10 months, respectively. The impact of global and U.S uncertainty shocks also differ 
in their effects on global CPI. While the response of global CPI to global uncertainty shocks is 
                                                          
13 We also estimate the Cholesky contemporaneous restriction matrix, allowing  𝑎44 to be estimated, and order 
both U.S and global uncertainty first and be estimated in separate models. Results are almost identical to those 
presented in Figure 5.  
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statistically significant and reaches a minimum of -0.08, the impact of U.S. uncertainty shocks 
on global CPI is much smaller and is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Finally, the global interest rate is negatively affected by a positive global uncertainty 
shock, but the effect is only marginally statistically significant. The response of global interest 
rate to U.S uncertainty shocks is much smaller and is not statistically significant. 
 
6. Does the source of uncertainty shocks matter for the global economy?  
 The central result in Section 4.2 is that the global uncertainty shocks have very different 
effects on the economy at different points in time. In this section, we show that global 
uncertainty shocks have different sources. We analyse the impact of global uncertainty shocks 
looking at their sources. In particular, we decompose global uncertainty shocks into global 
financial and non-financial shocks, where the shocks considered are those shocks that exceed 
1.65 standard deviations in terms of monthly observations.     
6.1. Financial vs. non-financial uncertainty shock 
 In this subsection, we distinguish between financial and non-financial shocks and 
estimate the impact effects of both shocks on the global economy. Shocks originating in 
economic or financial disruption may have been amenable to better economic policy design, 
whereas those due to war or terrorism are not (although political policies might have an impact). 
Examination of uncertainty shocks with an economic/financial source might lead to a better 
understanding of how economic policy might be designed to both avoid and mitigate the effects 
of future shocks.   
Our definition of global financial shocks comprises the following events that exceeded 
1.65 standard deviations: Black Monday, Russian Default, WorldCom and the GFC. The global 
financial crisis includes the five main events described in Table A3 (Appendix A), including 
the North Rock emergency funding in September 2007 and the nationalisation in February 
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2008, the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the 
bail out of American International Group (AIG) in the U.S in July 2008, September 2008 and 
October 2008, respectively. The non-financial uncertainty shocks that exceed 1.65 standard 
deviations include the Gulf War II and the 9/11 terrorist attack.  
To disaggregate global uncertainty shocks, we modify the system of equations by 
subtitling the unique variable 𝐺𝑈𝑡 into two different uncertainty shocks (i.e., 𝐷𝐹 ∗ 𝐺𝑈𝑡  and 
 𝐷𝑁𝐹 ∗ 𝐺𝑈𝑡), where the first variable the global financial uncertainty shock is constructed by 
interacting the  𝐺𝑈𝑡  index with a dummy variable 𝐷𝐹𝑡 , which takes the value of 1 when a 
financial shock occurs and 0 otherwise. Details of the period dummies can be found in 
Appendix A, Table A4. 14  The second variable (the non-financial uncertainty shocks) is 
constructed by interacting the  𝐺𝑈𝑡 index with a dummy variable 𝐷𝑁𝐹𝑡, which takes the value 
of 1 when a non-financial shock occurs and 0 otherwise.15 The new vector of endogenous 
variables is a (𝑚 = 5) × 1  vector, that is,   𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝐹𝐷𝐹𝑡 ∗
𝐺𝑈𝑡𝑈𝑡, 𝐷𝑁𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑈𝑡). The Cholesky lower triangle contemporaneous matrix is estimated using 
the following 𝐴0𝑦𝑡 matrix: 
[
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 0 0
𝑎11 1 0 0 0
𝑎21 𝑎22 1 0 0
𝑎31 𝑎32 𝑎33 1 0
𝑎41 𝑎42 𝑎43 0 1]
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡)
∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡)
𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡
𝐷𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑈𝑡
𝐷𝑁𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑈𝑡]
 
 
 
 
  (9) 
We set   𝑎44 to be zero, since there is no good reason to impose an order on financial and non-
financial uncertainty. 16 
                                                          
14 The dummy variables only take the value of 1 when the identified shock exceeds 1.65 standard deviations 
following Bloom (2009). 
15 We slightly innovate with respect of Bloom (2009), who uses only a single dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 when the uncertainty shock occurs and 0 otherwise. The reason for doing that is because Bloom (2009)’s 
definition does not capture the magnitude of the shock. By interacting the 𝐺𝑈𝑡  and a dummy variable, the shocks 
now also capture the dimension of the shock.  
16 Either eliminating the zero restriction on 𝑎44  and/or changing the order financial and non-financial uncertainty 
shocks do not alter the main results. 
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Figure 6 compares the impacts of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks on key 
global macroeconomic variables. In the first and second rows, we show the impact of financial 
and non-financial uncertainty shocks (respectively) on global industrial production (first 
column), CPI (second column) and interest rate (third column). 
Results in the first column suggest that financial uncertainty shocks have a much larger 
impact in absolute value than the non-financial shocks in reducing global industrial production 
(up to -0.17 and -0.10, respectively). Also, the impact of financial shocks on global industrial 
production is faster. The greatest impact of financial shocks on global industrial production is 
observed between 6 to 10 months later compared to 11 to 16 months later for non-financial 
shocks. The differences between the responses of Global CPI to those shocks are remarkable. 
Financial uncertainty shocks have a negative effect on global CPI, which is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. By contrast, non-financial shocks do not have a statistically 
significant effect on global CPI.  The third column of Figure 6 shows that central banks 
eventually reduce interest rates by similar amounts after both financial and non-financial 
shocks.  
6.2. Variance decomposition of global macroeconomic variables to financial and non-
financial uncertainty shocks 
Table 3 a), b) and c) report the fractions of forecast error variance decomposition 
(FEVDs) for the global industrial production, CPI and interest rate, respectively, contributed 
by all the variables, including global financial and non-financial uncertainty. Global industrial 
production growth, inflation, interest rate and financial uncertainty each make statistically 
significant contributions to forecasting the variation in global industrial production. The 
contribution of global financial uncertainty explains 18.26% of the variation in global growth 
after 48 months. By contrast, global non-financial uncertainty explains only 7.75% of the 
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variation in global growth (that is not statistically significant) after 48 months. After 48 months, 
global inflation and interest rate forecast 19.74% and 3.67% of variation in global growth. 
Global industrial production growth, interest rate, and financial uncertainty each make 
statistically significant contributions to forecasting the variation in global inflation, while 
global non-financial uncertainty does not. The contribution of global financial uncertainty 
explains 14.95% of the variation in global inflation after 48 months. In contrast to the effect on 
global industrial production, the global interest rate explains a large fraction variation (25.20%) 
in global inflation after 48 months. Only global growth explains a statistically significant 
fraction (10.60% after 48 months) of the variation in global interest rate. 
In summary, the forecast error variance decomposition results indicate that global 
financial uncertainty explains statistically significant fractions of the variation in global growth 
and global inflation over 48-month horizons, while global non-financial uncertainty does not. 
At the 48-month horizon, global financial uncertainty accounts for 18.26% and 14.95% of the 
variation in global growth and inflation, respectively. 
 
7. Effect of global uncertainty in presence of local uncertainty for domestic economies 
To determine whether the effect of global uncertainty on local macroeconomic 
variables is robust to the inclusion of local uncertainty, we re-estimate the SVAR for the largest 
developed and developing economies with both global and domestic uncertainty included as 
variables. The models are estimated separately for each economy.  
The model is described in Equation 10, where the first four variables in the SVAR 
system are variables for a specific economy and the last variable is global uncertainty. The 
endogenous variables in the model can be summarized as follows:    
 𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐷𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐷𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡 , 𝐷𝑈𝑡, 𝐺𝑈𝑡),           
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where 𝐷𝐼𝑃𝑡  is the domestic industrial production, 𝐷𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡  is the domestic CPI, 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡  is the 
domestic interest rate set by the central bank, 𝐷𝑈𝑡  is domestic uncertainty which is the 
volatility index of the domestic stock market, and 𝐺𝑈𝑡  is global uncertainty as described in 
previous models. The period estimated extends from January 1981 to December 2014, and data 
definitions, sources and period availabilities are presented in Table A5.17 The Cholesky lower 
triangle contemporaneous matrix is estimated using the following 𝐴0𝑦𝑡 matrix: 
[
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 0 0
𝑎11 1 0 0 0
𝑎21 𝑎22 1 0 0
𝑎31 𝑎32 𝑎33 1 0
𝑎41 𝑎42 𝑎43 𝑎44 1]
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
∆(𝐷𝐼𝑃)
∆(𝐷𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡)
𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡
𝐷𝑈𝑡
𝐺𝑈𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
  (10) 
Results for the impulse responses of domestic output, inflation and interest rate appear 
in Figures 7a and 7b for the largest developed and developing economies, respectively. Output 
declines significantly in each country with a rise in global uncertainty, even controlling for 
domestic uncertainty. The only exception is China, where the effect is negative but not 
statistically significant. The U.S. output is less affected by global uncertainty than the output 
of the other countries (with the exception of China). China’s economy may be less affected by 
global uncertainty, since China is less integrated into the world economy than other countries. 
The U.S. may be less affected by global uncertainty because of the size of its economy. 
The output of countries significantly affected by shocks to global uncertainty include 
commodity dependant countries (Brazil and Russia), major advanced countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK) and important emerging countries (India, Mexico and South 
Africa). The negative effect of global uncertainty on domestic output does not persist for as 
                                                          
17 The starting period for these estimations starts later than 1981 for some countries due to data availability. In 
particular, the starting period for Brazil is October 1996, January 1994 for China, January 1994 for India, January 
1997 for Russia and January 1990 for South Africa.  For all other countries, the full period sample is available 
from January 1981 to December 2014. 
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long in Japan as for most other countries, possibly due to relatively high levels of economic 
association with China’s economy. 
The responses of inflation and the official interest to positive shocks to global 
uncertainty are mostly negative and consistent with the result for the negative effect of shocks 
to global uncertainty on output. For most economies, a positive shock to global uncertainty has 
a depressing effect on output and prices, and central banks respond with a reduction in the 
official interest rate. Exceptions include Brazil, Mexico and Russia.  
For Brazil, Mexico and Russia, while an increase in global uncertainty is associated 
with depressed domestic output, the CPI and interest rate increased. In periods of high global 
uncertainty (e.g., a global financial crisis), large capital outflows take place in these economies 
and trigger higher inflation. As a consequence, the interest rate also increases to reduce capital 
outflows. Shaghil and Zlate (2013) document large capital outflow for both Asian emerging 
economies and Latin American economies during investor panic after the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy in 2008 (i.e., a period of high global uncertainty). Obstfeld et al. (2009) detail that 
Mexico, Brazil and Russia experience large currencies depreciations (above the average 
depreciation experienced by other emerging economies) during the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 
8. Robustness analysis  
We perform several robustness analyses. In Supplementary material 1, we reproduce 
all estimations from the previous section using a Factor Augmented Bayesian Vector 
Autoregressive (FABVAR) model. This methodology utilizes Bayesian analysis to capture 
uncertainty in the parameter estimation and in the precision of the reliability of inferences. As 
long as the prior distributions are proper, the lack of identification restrictions poses no 
conceptual problems in the Bayesian analysis because the posterior distributions are proper. 
The Bayesian analysis is explained in detail in the Supplementary material 1. 
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Results are shown for three different priors: Minnesota, Normal-Wishart and Sims-Zha. 
The Minnesota prior involves setting the regression coefficients to zero and lessening the 
overfitting risk in the VAR estimation. The Normal-Wishart/Sims-Zha priors provide a full 
Bayesian treatment of the regression coefficients and the elements of variance covariance 
matrix as unknown parameters in order to reflect parameter uncertainty more accurately. The 
results (discussed in more detail below) show that setting Normal-Wishart/Sims-Zha priors 
leads to the prediction similar to the FAVAR estimates, meaning that the non-informative 
priors do not do any of the shrinkage. The impulse response functions show smoother patterns 
by utilizing Minnesota shrinkage priors, which are very important in the VAR modeling. 
Overall, these results are robust to the findings of the FAVAR model.  
8.1. The effects of global uncertainty shocks on the economy in the FABVAR model 
 Figure B1 shows the impact of one-standard-deviation global uncertainty shocks on 
global industrial production growth, CPI inflation and interest rate for the FABVAR model, 
with vector of endogenous variables  𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝐺𝑈𝑡 ). The model is 
estimated with 3, 6 and 12 lags, as indicated on the left hand side of Figure B1. Each column 
in Figure B1 shows the response of global interest rate, CPI inflation and industrial production 
growth to global uncertainty shocks. The timing and magnitude of the responses to a one-time 
global uncertainty shock in the economy in Figure B1 are very similar to the results in Figure 
4 from the FAVAR model. 
In brief, global uncertainty shocks are accompanied by a quick decline in global 
industrial production growth that is most severe after 4 to 8 months. Global uncertainty shocks 
are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global CPI, reaching the greatest levels of 
decline after 6 to 12 months, depending on the number of lags and the prior adopted. Global 
uncertainty shocks are associated with a decline in global interest rate that persists with the 
greatest decline in the global interest rate observed over 16 to 20 months. The only exception 
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to the latter results for the impact of global uncertainty on the global interest rate is for the 
FABVAR model with Sims-Zha prior, for which the decline in interest rate is greatest after 7 
or 8 months and is reversed after 10 months. 
8.2. Effects of global uncertainty and U.S. uncertainty shocks in the FABVAR model 
The effects of global uncertainty and U.S. uncertainty shocks on the variables in the 
FABVAR model are now presented. The vector of endogenous variables is a (𝑚 = 5) × 1 
given by   𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝑈𝑆𝑈𝑡, 𝐺𝑈𝑡 ). The responses of global industrial 
production, CPI and interest rate to global uncertainty shocks and to U.S. uncertainty shocks 
are shown in the first and second rows of Figure B2, respectively.  
The results for the responses to global uncertainty (after controlling for U.S. 
uncertainty) are well defined for all priors and are very similar to the results obtained from the 
FAVAR model shown in Figure 5. A one-standard-deviation shock to global uncertainty is 
associated with decreases in global industrial production over 1 to 16 months, persistent 
reductions in global CPI with the deepest decline over 3 to 12 months (depending on prior) and 
continual reductions in the global interest rate with the most decline over 12 to 16 months 
(depending on the prior). 
The results for the responses to U.S. uncertainty after controlling for global uncertainty 
are also similar to the results obtained from the FAVAR model shown in Figure 5, meaning 
that they are small and ill defined. The results from the FABVAR model reinforce the finding 
that global uncertainty shocks dominate U.S. uncertainty shocks in terms of their influence on 
the global economy. The responses of global output, CPI and interest rate to U.S uncertainty 
shocks are much smaller in absolute value than the negative responses of global output, CPI 
and interest rate to global uncertainty shocks. 
8.3. Financial vs. non-financial uncertainty shock in the FABVAR model 
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The impacts of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks on the global 
macroeconomic variables estimated from the FABVAR model are presented in Figure B3. The 
vector of endogenous variables is  𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡,   𝐹𝐷𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑈𝑡𝑈𝑡, 𝐷𝑁𝐹𝑡 ∗
𝐺𝑈𝑡), where the fifth and sixth variables are the global financial uncertainty and global non-
financial uncertainty components of global uncertainty. In the first and second rows of Figure 
B3, the impact of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks on global industrial 
production, CPI and interest rate are shown. Results for the impacts of global financial and 
non-financial uncertainty shocks are similar to those reported for the earlier FAVAR model (in 
Figure 6). 
The financial uncertainty shocks have a much larger impact on the absolute value than 
the non-financial shocks in reducing global industrial production. The differences between the 
responses of global CPI to global financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks persist in the 
FABVAR estimation. Financial uncertainty shocks have a negative effect on global CPI, and 
non-financial shocks have a positive effect. Declines in global interest are associated with both 
global financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks, but now the effect of the financial shock 
is persistently negative. 
8.4. Effects of global uncertainty on domestic economies in the FABVAR model 
Results for the impulse responses of domestic output, inflation and interest rate for the 
largest economies from the FABVAR model appear in Figures B4 and B5 for developed or 
developing economies, respectively. The endogenous variables in the FABVAR model 
estimated are given by  𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐷𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐷𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝐷𝑈𝑡 , 𝐺𝑈𝑡) ,  where the first four 
variables are output, CPI, interest rate and uncertainty for a large developed or developing 
economy; the last variable is global uncertainty. Results are again similar to those reported for 
the FAVAR model. 
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In Figures B4 and B5, the decline in the U.S. and China outputs are more muted in 
response to increased global uncertainty than the outputs of the other countries. For most 
countries, the responses of domestic inflation and the official interest to positive shocks to 
global uncertainty are negative and consistent with the result for the negative effect of shocks 
to global uncertainty on domestic output. The exceptions are Brazil, Mexico and Russia. For 
Brazil, Mexico and Russia, an increase in global uncertainty is associated with increases in the 
official interest rate, and for Mexico and Russia, an increase in global uncertainty is associated 
with increases the official interest. 
8.5. Ordering of variables 
To accomplish an additional robustness check, we provided FAVAR models using a 
reverse ordering of variables in the Cholesky-VAR system, as proposed by Bloom (2009); 
these models can be found in the supplementary material section. These results confirm the 
sign and statistical significance of the results from the main models estimated in the text. 
8.6. Alternative measure of global uncertainty  
In this section, we explore the use of three alternative measures of global uncertainty.  
The first alternative measure proposed is the GDP-weighted index of country specific volatility 
(also for the largest 15 economies). For this alternative measure, we weight each country of the 
15 largest economies using GDP Purchase Power Parity (PPP) in U.S. dollars as reported by 
the Wold Bank. The main drawback of this measure is that the intertemporal change in weights 
can only be incorporated annually as this data is only available on an annual basis from the 
World Bank.  
A second alternative measure considered is for the largest 20 economies (rather than 15 
economies) using the principal component analysis described in Equations 1 to 3. The 
additional countries included in this measure are Indonesia, Iran, Thailand, Nigeria and Poland. 
The stock market data for these countries is only available for a shorter span (generally from 
 
 
26 
 
the 1990s), and therefore the inclusion of these five countries only change the benchmark 
measure of global uncertainty from 1990.  
The third alternative measure is based on the notion from Jurado et al. (2015) that 
uncertainty can be defined as the unforecastable component of a linear regression.  In the spirit 
of this definition, we consider the residual of the following equation as a measure of global 
uncertainty: 
𝐺𝑈𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑈𝑡+1 + 𝜖                                           (11) 
where 𝐺𝑈𝑡 is the global uncertainty index from Equation 1 to 3, 𝐺𝑈𝑡+1  is the same index at 
time 𝑡+1 and is considered the optimal forecast under the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
and 𝜖 is the residual or uncertainty measure.18  
Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients of alternative measures of global 
uncertainty. The correlations are very high amongst these four measures, ranging from 0.98 to 
0.94.  In results available from the authors, we show that either measure of global uncertainty 
leads to very similar results in both the FAVAR and FABVAR models.  
 
9. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the impact of global uncertainty on the global economy and 
on large developed and developing economies. This supplements the recent literature that has 
analyzed the effects of uncertainty (either U.S. or global) on country-level macroeconomic 
variables. Using principal component analysis of the stock market volatility indexes for the 
largest 15 economies, a global uncertainty measure is identified. Taking advantage of the new 
global database from DGEI from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, we explore the impact 
                                                          
18 The EMH predicts that prices on traded assets (and/or future prices) already reflect all past publicly available 
information. Consequently, the residual of this Equation can be interpreted as uncertainty using Jurado et al 
(2015)’s rationale.   
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of global uncertainty on key global macroeconomic variables of major developed and 
developing economies. 
   We find that global uncertainty shocks are associated with a sharp decline in global 
industrial production, inflation and interest rate. The maximum decline of industrial production 
and global inflation occurs six months after a global uncertainty shock, while the maximum 
decline in global interest rate occurs after 16 months after a global uncertainty shock. At the 
country level, global uncertainty shocks (even controlling for domestic uncertainty) reduce 
outputs in most large developed and developing economies. Outputs from Russia, Brazil and 
South Africa are most affected by global uncertainty shocks, while outputs from China and the 
U.S. and U.K. are less responsive to these shocks. 
We use existing knowledge on important global events to distinguish between financial 
and non-financial uncertainty shocks. Our decomposition of global uncertainty shocks shows 
that global financial uncertainty shocks are more important (for the global economy) than non-
financial uncertainty shocks. From 1981 to 2014, global financial uncertainty forecasts 18.26% 
and 14.95% of the variation in global growth and global inflation, respectively, while non-
financial uncertainty shocks forecast only 7.75% and 2.15% of the variation in global growth 
and global inflation, respectively.  
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Table 1. Correlation of the lag structure between global and the U.S. uncertainty (cross 
correlogram)  
 
Global, U.S. (-i) Global ,U.S.(+i) i lag lead 
          .|++ |           .|++| 0 0.165 0.165 
          .||           .|+++++++++| 1 0.001 0.889 
          .||           .|++| 2 0.023 0.218 
          .|+|           .|| 3 0.049 -0.008 
          .||           .|+| 4 0.014 0.112 
          .|+|           .|+| 5 0.155 0.108 
          .||           .|+| 6 0.036 0.051 
          .||           .|++| 7 -0.022 0.163 
          .|+|           .|+| 8 0.060 0.101 
          .||           .| | 9 0.043 0.010 
          .||           .|+| 10 -0.012 0.085 
          .||           .|+| 11 -0.019 0.118 
          .||           .|| 12 -0.004 0.030 
Note that in column 1 and 2 are only for optical view, + represents a value close to 0.1 correlation. 
 
Table 2. Granger causality test between global and the U.S. uncertainty 
Null Hypothesis: x does not Granger cause y 
Granger test/Lags 1 3 6 12 
Global uncertainty does not granger 
cause U.S. uncertainty 
1479.01*** 496.04*** 237.05*** 119.05*** 
U.S. Uncertainty does not granger 
cause global  uncertainty 
0.58 3.57** 2.77** 1.02 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10%, levels of significance 
respectively. 
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Table 3. Variance decomposition of global macroeconomic variables 
 
a. Forecast error variance decomposition of global industrial production 
Contribution 
from/months 
Global IP Global CPI Global IR Financial 
uncertainty 
shock 
Non-financial 
uncertainty 
shock 
1 100.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 85.99*** 0.82 0.05 12.25*** 0.88 
12 64.71*** 10.86* 0.83 18.95*** 4.66 
18 52.48*** 19.78** 2.70** 17.26*** 7.78 
24 51.21*** 20.51*** 3.43** 16.85*** 8.00 
30 51.44*** 19.54*** 3.28** 18.11*** 7.63 
36 50.71*** 19.75*** 3.46** 18.35*** 7.73 
48 50.58*** 19.74*** 3.67** 18.26*** 7.75 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10%, levels of significance 
respectively. 
 
 
b. Forecast error variance decomposition of global CPI 
Contribution 
from/months 
Global IP Global CPI Global IR Financial 
uncertainty 
shock 
Non-financial 
uncertainty 
shock 
1 0.19 99.81*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 7.02 85.77*** 0.24 5.44* 1.53 
12 14.95** 66.66*** 2.75 13.02** 2.63 
18 18.95** 54.21*** 8.02* 16.64** 2.17 
24 18.90*** 47.68*** 14.35** 16.88** 2.19 
30 18.02*** 44.15*** 19.52** 16.08** 2.22 
36 17.45*** 41.99*** 22.98** 15.40** 2.18 
48 17.31*** 40.40*** 25.20** 14.95** 2.15 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10%, levels of significance 
respectively. 
 
 
c. Forecast error variance decomposition of global interest rate 
Contribution 
from/months 
Global IP Global CPI Global IR Financial 
uncertainty 
shock 
Non-financial 
uncertainty 
shock 
1 2.86 0.03 97.11*** 0.00 0.00 
6 4.20 0.09 95.24*** 0.34 0.14 
12 6.95 0.07 91.06*** 0.94 0.99 
18 9.21 0.10 87.51*** 1.72 1.46 
24 10.36 0.23 85.21*** 2.28 1.92 
30 10.64 0.36 84.27*** 2.49 2.24 
36 10.62* 0.41 84.03*** 2.53 2.41 
48 10.60* 0.42 83.97*** 2.52 2.49 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10%, levels of significance 
respectively. 
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Table 4. Correlation of alternative measures of global uncertainty.  
 
 Benchmark GDP-weighted G20 
economies 
Residual 
approach 
Benchmark 1 - - - 
GDP-weighted 0.98 1 - - 
G20 economies 0.97 0.97 1  
Residual approach 0.94 0.93 0.93 1 
Notes: Benchmark refers to the main measure of global uncertainty described in Equation 1-3 for the largest 15 
economies. GDP-weighted is also considering the largest 15 economies, but rather than use principal component 
analysis, the weight is imputed from GDP PPP annual measure from World Bank. G20 economies includes 
additional 5 countries (Indonesia, Iran, Thailand, Nigeria and Poland). Residual approach refers to the procedure 
explain in equation 11, where global uncertainty is measure as a residual of the perfect forecast (see section 8.6).  
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Figure 1. Global volatility index: 12-month moving average standard deviation 
 
 
 
Figure 2. U.S. volatility index: 12-month moving average standard deviation 
 
 
Figure 3. Global and U.S. volatility indices scaled so that mean volatilities are equal.  
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Figure 4. Responses of global industrial production, inflation and interest rate to global 
uncertainty shocks      
Lags in 
VAR 
Response of GIP to GU Response of GCPI to GU Response GIR to GU 
 
 
 
 
3 
   
 
 
 
 
6 
   
 
 
 
 
12 
   
Notes: The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients 
of the impulse response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described 
by Sims (1980), where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient. 
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Figure 5. Responses of global variables to U.S. and global uncertainty shocks      
Uncertainty 
Shocks 
Response of GIP Response of GCPI Response GIR 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
    
Notes: to conserve space we only report results when 6 lags are specified in the FAVAR system. Results for 3 and 
12 lags are available from the authors upon request. 
Figure 6. Responses of global variables to financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks      
Uncertainty 
Shocks 
Response of GIP Response of GCPI Response GIR 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that to conserve space we only report results when 6 lags are specified in the FAVAR system. Results for 3 
and 12 lags are available from the authors upon request.  
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Figure 7a. Responses of large developed economies to global uncertainty shocks 
Notes: The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse 
response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980), where 
5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient. 
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Figure 7b. Responses of large developing economies to global uncertainty shocks 
Notes: The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients 
of the impulse response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described 
by Sims (1980), where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient.  
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Appendix A: Data Appendix 
Table A1. Data estimations for Equations 1 to 3, global uncertainty index. Stock market data 
from Datastream 5.1.  
 
Main stock market indicators by country                                                               Period  
Australia: Standard & Poor’s/ASX  200 Index. Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
Brazil: BM&F BOVESPA Index  Jan 1991- Dec 2014 
Canada: Toronto Stock Exchange index Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
China: Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index Dec 1990- Dec 2014 
France: France CAC 40 Stock Market Index Jan 1987- Dec 2014 
Germany: Deutsche Boerse AG German Stock Index  Jan 1993- Dec 2014 
India: NSE CNX 100 Index Jan 2003- Dec 2014 
Italy: FTSE MIB Index Mar 2003- Dec 2014 
Japan: NIKKEI 225 Stock Market Index Jul 1988- Dec 2014 
Mexico: Mexican Bolsa IPC Index Dec 1991-Dec 2014 
Russia: Russia MICEX Stock Market Index  Jan 1994- Dec 2014 
South Korea: Korea Stock Exchange KOSPI Index Jan 1990- Dec 2014 
South Africa: South Africa FTSE/JSE Index Jan 2001- Dec 2014 
U.S: Standard & Poor’s 500 index. Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
U.K: UK FTSE 100 Stock Market Index Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
 
Table A2. Data estimations for Equations 4 to 7. Global databased from Database of Global 
Economic Indicators, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
 
Name and description           Period  
IP for the U.S: is the total industrial production excluding construction 
for the U.S economy, index 2005=100. 
Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
IP for advanced economies (ex. U.S): is the total industrial production 
excluding construction for the largest 31 advanced economies excluding 
the U.S, index 2005=100. 
Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
IP for emerging economies: is the total industrial production excluding 
construction for the largest 26 emerging economies, index 2005=100. 
Jan 1987- Dec 2014 
CPI for the U.S: is the headline consumer price index for the U.S, index 
2005=100. 
Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
CPI for advanced economies (ex. U.S): is the headline consumer price 
index for the largest 31 advanced economies excluding the U.S, index 
2005=100. 
Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
CPI for emerging economies: is the headline consumer price index for 
the largest emerging economies excluding the U.S, index 2005=100. 
Feb 1984- Dec 2014 
Interest rate for the U.S: Federal funds target rate Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
Interest rate for advanced economies (ex. the U.S: Short term official 
policy rate (maturity 3 months or less) for the largest 31 advanced 
economies excluding the U.S. 
July 1985- Dec 2014 
Interest rate for emerging economies (ex. the U.S): Short term official 
policy rate (maturity 3 months or less) for the largest 26 emerging 
economies excluding the U.S. 
Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
Notes: Global indicators for advanced and emerging are aggregated using U.S trade weights (for more detail see: 
Grossman, Mack and Martinez-Garcia). The largest economies according PPP-adjusted GDP shares from the IMF 
World Economic Outlook. 
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Table A3. Chronology of the global financial crisis events 
 
Period  Event  
September 13, 2007 Northern Rock has sought emergency funding from the Bank of 
England in its capacity as "lender of last resort" 
February 17, 2008 The U.K. government announces that struggling Northern Rock is to 
be nationalised for a temporary period. 
July 14, 2008 Financial authorities in U.S. step in to assist America's two largest 
lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, owners or guarantors of 5 
trillion worth of home loans. 
September 15, 2008 Wall Street bank Lehman Brothers (U.S.) files for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection and another US bank, Merrill Lynch, is taken 
over by the Bank of America. 
October 20, 2008 The U.S. government took control of AIG. The U.S.  The federal 
government to take control of the company and guarantee to loan it 
up to $85 billion. 
 
 
Table A4. Dummy variables for financial and non-financial shocks for Equation 9 
 
Global financial shocks above 1.65 SD  Global non-financial shocks above 1.65 SD 
Shock 
 
Monthly dummy Shock Monthly dummy 
Black Monday February to July 1987 September 11 
terrorist attack 
September to November 
2001 
Russian sovereign 
debt crisis 
 
May and June 1997  
Gulf War II 
 
May  to August 2002 
Global financial 
crisis  
September 2007 to 
November 2008 
  
The dummy variables only take the value of 1 when the identified shock exceeds 1.65 standard deviations 
following Bloom (2009). 
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Table A5. Data estimations for Equations 10. Individual country estimations.  
 
Variable: Industrial production, sa: the index cover production in mining, manufacturing and 
public utilities (electricity, gas and water), but excluding construction. The data is from 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Country Period Country Period 
Brazil Jan 1981- Dec 2014 Japan Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
China Mar 1990- Dec 2014 Mexico Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
France Jan 1981- Dec 2014 Russia Jan 1993- Dec 2014 
Germany Jan 1981- Dec 2014 South Africa  Jan 1990- Dec 2014 
India Jan 1994- Dec 2014 U.S Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
Italy Jan 1981- Dec 2014 U.K Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
    
Variable: Consumer price index (all items), sa, is defined as the change in the prices of a 
basket of goods and services that are typically purchased by all households. The data is from 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Country Period Country Period 
Brazil Jan 1981- Dec 2014 Japan Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
China Jan 1994- Dec 2014 Mexico Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
France Jan 1981- Dec 2014 Russia Jan 1997- Dec 2014 
Germany Jan 1981- Dec 2014 South Africa  Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
India Jan 1981- Dec 2014 U.S Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
Italy Jan 1981- Dec 2014 U.K Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
    
Variable: Official interest rate:  
Country Period Country Period 
Brazil Oct 1996- Dec 2014 Japan Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
China Mar 1990- Dec 2014 Mexico Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
France Jan 1981- Dec 2014 Russia Jan 1993- Dec 2014 
Germany Jan 1981- Dec 2014 South Africa  Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
India Jan 1981- Dec 2014 U.S Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
Italy Jan 1981- Dec 2014 U.K Jan 1981- Dec 2014 
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Supplementary Material: The Bayesian Approach 
 The VAR model in Equation (4) is conventionally estimated by ordinary least square 
(OLS) or maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). For the economic application of the VAR 
model, accurate estimation of finite sample distributions of (𝐴, Σ) is important (such as the 
approximation of nonlinear impulse-response functions). However, the VAR model includes 
(𝑝 + 1)𝑚 unknown parameters for the vector of regression coefficient and 𝑚 × 𝑚 unknown 
elements of the variance-covariance matrix. In the OLS/MLE estimation, the number of 
unknown parameters are relatively large relative to the data at hand. To assess the robustness, 
we utilize the Bayesian analysis to capture the uncertainty in the parameter estimation and in 
the valuation for the precision of inference and the reliability of prediction.  
A Bayesian version of the FAVAR model in Equation (4) is now described.  For 
compactness we may rewrite the model in Equation (4) as 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝐴 + 𝐸, (A.1) 
or  
𝑦 = (𝐼𝑚 ⨂𝑋)𝜃 + 𝑒 , (A.1’) 
where Y and E are 𝑇 × 𝑚  matrices, 𝑋 = (𝑥1, … . , 𝑥𝑡)′  is a 𝑇 × (𝑚𝑝 + 1)  matrix for 𝑥 =
(1, 𝑦𝑡−1
′ , … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑞
′ ) , 𝐼𝑚  is the identify matrix of dimension 𝑚, 𝜃 = 𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝐴), and  
 𝑒𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝛴𝜖 ⨂𝐼𝑇) . The likelihood function is: 
𝑙(𝜃, Σ𝜖) ∝  |Σ𝜖 ⊗ 𝐼𝑇|
−0.5exp  {−0.5(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚 ⊗ 𝑋)𝜃)
′(𝛴𝜖⊗𝐼𝑇)
−1
(𝑦 − (𝐼𝑚 ⊗ 𝑋)𝜃)}. (A.2) 
To derive the posterior moments in the Bayesian analysis, let assume that Σ𝜖 is known 
and a multivariate normal prior for 𝜃 is 
Π(𝜃) ∝  |V𝑜|
−0.5exp  {−0.5(𝜃 − 𝜃0)′𝑉0
−1(𝜃 − 𝜃0)}, (A.3) 
where 𝜃0 is the prior mean and V𝑜 is the prior variance-covariance matrix. When we combine 
this prior with the likelihood function, the posterior density can be written as 
Π(𝜃|𝑦) =  exp {−0.5((𝑉0
−0.5(𝜃 − 𝜃0)′𝑉0
−0.5(𝜃 − 𝜃0) 
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+{(Σ𝜖
−0.5 ⊗ 𝐼𝑇) − (𝛴𝜖
−0.5 ⊗ 𝑋)𝜃}′{(𝛴𝜖
−0.5 ⊗ 𝐼𝑇)𝑦 − (𝛴𝜖
−0.5 ⊗ 𝑋)𝜃})} , (A.4) 
a multivariate normal probability density function. Define  
𝜔 ≡ [
𝑉0
−0.5𝜃0
(𝛴𝜖
−0.5⊗𝐼𝑇)𝑦
] ,  
𝑊 ≡ [
𝑉0̅
−0.5
(𝛴𝜖
−0.5⊗𝑋)
] . 
The posterior density is  
Π(𝜃|𝑦) ∝  exp {−0.5((𝜔 − 𝑊𝜃)′(𝜔 − 𝑊𝜃)} ∝ 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−0.5(𝜃 − ?̅?)′𝑊′𝑊(𝜃 − ?̅?) + (𝜔 − 𝑊?̅?)′(𝜔 − 𝑊?̅?)},   (A.5) 
where the posterior mean ?̅? is: 
?̅? = (𝑊′𝑊)−1𝑊′𝜔 = [𝑉0
−1 + (𝛴𝜖
−1 ⊗ 𝑋′𝑋)]−1[𝑉0
−1𝜃0 + (𝛴𝜖
−1 ⊗ 𝑋)′𝑦] . (A.6) 
 We utilize a Minnesota prior that involves setting the elements of  𝜃0 to be zero to 
ensure shrinkage of the VAR coefficients toward zero and reduce the over-fitting risk. It 
assumes the prior covariance matrix V𝑜 to be diagonal, in the sense that own lags of endogenous 
variables are more likely to be important predictors than lags of other variables. The error 
variance-covariance matrix is the standard OLS estimate of the error terms Σ?̂? = 𝑆/𝑇. 
Alternatively, we estimate the FABVAR model using two different non-informative 
priors, in that the Minnesota prior ignores any uncertainty in the elements of error variance-
covariance matrix 𝛴𝜖 . The first is the natural conjugate prior that treats 𝛴𝜖  as an unknown 
parameter, 𝛴𝜖
−1 ∼ 𝑊(𝑆−1, 𝑣), where 𝑆 is the prior hyper-parameters. Here we choose small 
degree of freedom parameters, 𝑣 = 𝑚(𝑚 − 1) + 1 and 𝑆 = 0.01 × 𝑚(𝑚 − 1) × 𝐼𝑚(𝑚−1), in 
order to put a small weight on the priors that makes the priors to contain small amount of 
information relative to the sample. The second is the Sims-Zha normal-Wishart prior for 𝛴𝜖 
using the fictitious observations (Sim and Zha (2008)), for example Σ?̂? = (𝑋
′𝑋)−1.  
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Figure B1. FABVAR model: Response of global industrial production, global inflation 
and global interest rate to global uncertainty shocks      
Lags in 
VAR 
Response of GIP to GU Response of GCPI to GU Response GIR to GU 
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Figure B2. FABVAR model: Responses of global variables to U.S and global uncertainty 
shocks     
Uncertainty          Response of GIP to GU 
  Shocks 
Response of GCPI to GU Response GIR to GU 
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Notes: To conserve space we only report results when 6 lags are specified in the FABVAR system. Results for 3 
and 12 lags are available from the authors upon request.  
Figure B3. FABVAR model: Responses of global variables to financial and non-financial 
uncertainty shocks     
 Notes: To conserve space we only report results when 6 lags are specified in the FABVAR system. Results for 3 
and 12 lags are available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure B4. FABVAR: Responses of large developed economies to global uncertainty 
shocks 
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Figure B5. FABVAR: Responses of large developing economies to global uncertainty 
shocks 
 Response of Domestic Output Response of Domestic CPI Response Domestic IR 
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Discussion  
1. The effects of global uncertainty shocks on the economy in the FABVAR model 
 Figure B1 shows the impact of one standard deviation global uncertainty shocks on 
global industrial production growth, global CPI inflation and global interest rate for the 
FABVAR model, with vector of endogenous variables  𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡),
∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝐺𝑈𝑡 ). The model is estimated with 3, 6 and 12 lags, as indicated on the left 
hand side of Figure B1. Each column in Figure B1 shows the response of global interest rate, 
global CPI inflation and global industrial production growth to global uncertainty shocks. The 
timing and magnitude of the responses to a one-time global uncertainty shock in the economy 
in Figure B1 are very similar to the results in Figure 4 from the FAVAR model. 
In brief, global uncertainty shocks are accompany a quick decline in global industrial 
production growth that is most severe after 4 to 8 months. Global uncertainty shocks are 
associated with a quick and sharp decline in global CPI reaching the greatest levels of decline 
after 6 to 12 months, depending on the number of lags and the prior adopted. Global uncertainty 
shocks are associated with a decline in global interest rate that persists, with the greatest decline 
in the global interest rate observed over 16 to 20 months. The only exception to the latter results 
for the impact of global uncertainty on the global interest rate is for the FABVAR model with 
Sims-Zha prior, for which case the decline in interest rate is greatest after 7 or 8 months and is 
reversed after 10 months. 
2. Effects of global uncertainty and U.S. uncertainty shocks in the FABVAR model 
The effects of global uncertainty and U.S. uncertainty shocks on the variables in the 
FABVAR model are now presented. The vector of endogenous variables is a (𝑚 = 5) × 1 
given by   𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝑈𝑆𝑈𝑡, 𝐺𝑈𝑡 ). The responses of global industrial 
production, CPI and interest rate to global uncertainty shocks and to U.S. uncertainty shocks 
are shown in the first and second rows of Figure B2 respectively.  
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The results for the responses to global uncertainty (after controlling for U.S. 
uncertainty) are well defined for all priors and very similar to the results obtained from the 
FAVAR model shown in Figure 5. A one-standard deviation shock to global uncertainty is 
associated with decreases in global industrial production over 1 to 16 months, persistent 
reductions in global CPI with the deepest decline over 3 to 12 months (depending on prior), 
and continual reductions in the global interest rate with the most decline over 12 to 16 months 
(depending on prior). 
The results for the responses to U.S. uncertainty after controlling for global uncertainty 
are also similar to the results obtained from the FAVAR model shown in Figure 5, in that they 
are small and ill defined. The results from the FABVAR model reinforce the finding that global 
uncertainty shocks dominate U.S. uncertainty shocks in terms of influence on the global 
economy. The responses of global output, CPI and interest rate to U.S uncertainty shocks are 
much smaller in absolute value than the negative responses of global output, CPI and interest 
rate to global uncertainty shocks. 
3. Financial vs. non-financial uncertainty shock in the FABVAR model 
The impacts of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks on the global 
macroeconomic variables estimated from the FABVAR model are presented in Figure B3. The 
vector of endogenous variables is  𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐺𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐺𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝑡,   𝐹𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑈𝑡 , 𝐷𝑁𝐹𝑡 ∗
𝐺𝑈𝑡), where the fifth and sixth variables are the global financial uncertainty and global non-
financial uncertainty components of global uncertainty. In the first and second rows of Figure 
B3 the impact of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks on global industrial production, 
CPI and interest rate are shown. Results for the impacts of global financial and non-financial 
uncertainty shocks are similar to those reported for the FAVAR model earlier (in Figure 6). 
The financial uncertainty shocks have a much larger impact in absolute value than the 
non-financial shocks in reducing global industrial production. The differences between the 
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responses of global CPI to global financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks persist in the 
FABVAR estimation. Financial uncertainty shocks have a negative effect on global CPI and 
non-financial shocks have a positive effect. Decline in global interest is associated with both 
global financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks, but now the effect of the financial shock 
is persistently negative. 
4. Effects of global uncertainty on domestic economies in the FABVAR model. 
Results for the impulse responses of domestic output, domestic inflation and domestic 
interest rate for the largest economies from the FABVAR model appear in Figures B4 and B5 
for developed or developing economy respectively. The endogenous variables in the FABVAR 
model estimated are given by  𝑦𝑡 = (∆(𝐷𝐼𝑃𝑡), ∆(𝐷𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡), 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡, 𝐷𝑈𝑡 , 𝐺𝑈𝑡),  where the first four 
variables are output, CPI, interest rate and uncertainty for a large developed or developing 
economy and the last variable is global uncertainty. Results are again similar to those reported 
for the FAVAR model. 
In Figures B4 and B5 the decline in the outputs of the US and of China are more muted 
in response to increased global uncertainty than are the outputs of the other countries. For most 
countries, the responses of domestic inflation and the official interest to positive shocks to 
global uncertainty are negative and consistent with the result for the negative effect of shocks 
to global uncertainty on domestic output. The exceptions are again Brazil, Mexico and Russia. 
For Brazil, Mexico and Russia, an increase in global uncertainty is associated with increases 
the official interest rate, and Mexico and Russia an increase in global uncertainty is associated 
with increases the official interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
